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13 October 1960

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

13 October 1960

### DAILY BRIEF

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#### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

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USSR Agriculture: Two of Khrushchev's favorite agricultural programs face a setback this year. Sizable grain losses such as occurred last year are expected in the New Lands, where snow has begun to fall before the harvest has been completed. The Soviet press recently acknowledged, furthermore, that the major campaign for meat and milk production is lagging well behind overambitious planned goals. Khrushchev was closely associated with the establishment of the New Lands program. Last year's poor record in the area resulted in a severe shake-up of the Kazakh party organization. Another low harvest there would probably have further political repercussions. (Page 1)

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North - South Vietnam: Rounding out Hanoi's recent policy guidelines on "reunification" of North and South Vietnam, the top political general in the North Vietnamese Army has emphasized the importance of violence in overthrowing South Vietnam's President Diem. In an article which appeared in a recent issue of the North Vietnamese party journal, he pointed out that "peaceful" efforts to topple Diem may have a "certain efficacy" but that, along with the broad united-front strategy outlined at the recent North Vietnamese party congress, guerrilla warfare in the South will play an important role. Intensified guerrilla action over the past year has posed a serious security problem in provinces south and southwest of Saigon and has recently shown signs of spreading to the previously quiescent northern region of South Vietnam. [ ] (Page 2)

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Communist China - Japan: Peiping has abandoned its "wait-and-see" attitude toward Japanese Prime Minister Ikeda and has apparently decided to support leftist agitation for his ouster. Describing Ikeda as "no different in essence" from Kishi, Peiping now charges that the present government in Tokyo is as subservient to the US as was the preceding administration and that it is bent on reviving Japanese militarism. This apparent effort to influence the Japanese elections next month may backfire, as did a similar effort in May 1958. [ ] (Page 3)

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The assassination of Japanese Socialist party chairman Inejiro Asanuma will provide impetus for Socialist attacks on the Ikeda government in the coming Diet session and generate support for leftist demonstrations in the November election campaign. The struggle over a successor to Asanuma may stimulate the party to reassess its anti-American position. [ ] (Page 4)

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## II. ASIA-AFRICA

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Laos: [redacted] asserts that pro-Phoumi sentiment among officers of the First Military Region, with headquarters at Luang Prabang, has increased as a result of the apparent realignment recently of Xieng Khouang Province toward Phoumi's Savannakhet Revolutionary Committee. Col. Houmpanh, the First Military Region commander, has maintained a precarious neutrality between Vientiane and Savannakhet but now may be leaning toward Phoumi. Continuing Pathet Lao attacks in Phong Saly Province, which is under Houmpanh's jurisdiction, may persuade him to cut off all ties with Vientiane and possibly to come out openly for Phoumi. Pathet Lao guerrilla elements have taken two posts in southeastern Phong Saly, in violation of the cease-fire that was supposed to have been arranged in the area. [redacted]

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### III. THE WEST

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Argentina: Without specifically referring to the army's ultimatum of 11 October demanding various policy and cabinet changes, President Frondizi made a radio appeal on 12 October for the support of constitutional government "against action by minor groups who want to re-establish hatred, persecution, and economic retrogression." He stressed that in no case would he resign. Frondizi said he would accept suggestions but would make all decisions within his constitutional authority. Frondizi's public counterattack and subsequent conferences with the military may have weakened the army's previous unity in support of its ultimatum.

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\*Frondizi last night dismissed army commander Toranzo Montero, the key figure involved in the 11 October ultimatum. As of 0200 EDT on 13 October, it was not clear whether this dismissal would put an end to the immediate crisis.

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### IV. WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS

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B. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends deliberately to initiate direct military action against US forces abroad, US allies, or areas peripheral to the Orbit in the immediate future.

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BERLIN

The bloc pressure on the Western position in Berlin continues.

Situations susceptible of direct exploitation by Soviet/Communist hostile action:

LAOS

The Pathet Lao are in a strong negotiating position and seriously threaten the political orientation of the country, particularly as long as Lao Government military forces are split into contending factions.

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### USSR Agriculture Faces Setback This Year

Two of Khrushchev's pet agricultural programs--the New Lands and livestock production--are in difficulty this fall. By 1 October less than two thirds of the grain had been gathered in the New Lands areas of Siberia and northern Kazakhstan, and deliveries of grain to the state in these areas were running behind the average for previous years. Harvesting in Kazakhstan is later than in 1959, when large areas of unharvested grain were covered with snow. The area remaining to be harvested will yield only a small amount of usable grain; much of the grain crop has been damaged by rain and wind or has failed to ripen.

A recent Pravda editorial admits that meat and dairy production is lagging behind the growth rates needed to achieve the Seven-Year-Plan targets and that the output of livestock products has actually decreased in certain republics and oblasts. The editorial pointed out that pork production in the Ukraine declined by 19 percent for the first eight months of this year in comparison with production in the same period last year. While this decline is likely to be offset, at least in part, by increased slaughtering elsewhere, the livestock program as a whole can be expected to show little improvement in 1960. Production may actually decline, thus interrupting the rapid increase sustained so far during the Khrushchev regime.

The Soviet consumers' expectations, raised by the Seven-Year-Plan goals and Khrushchev's ambitious and unrealistic program for "catching up" with the United States in per capita production of livestock products, will be further frustrated. A poor agricultural showing in Kazakhstan could touch off--as it did last year--a major shake-up in the party and government leadership of the republic. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]  
North Vietnam, May 1960-1970, General Office, Hanoi, 1-2  
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Extolling violence as a technique for achieving power in Vietnam, North Vietnamese General Nguyen Chi Thanh recently published an article virtually pledging the Hanoi regime to intensify guerrilla warfare as part of its strategy to overthrow South Vietnam's President Diem. Appearing in the August-September issue of Hoc Tap, the North Vietnamese party journal, the article elaborates on the more militant aspects of Hanoi's recent policy guidelines on "reunification" of North and South Vietnam.

At the recent North Vietnamese party congress, spokesmen called for a program to oust Diem by unifying Communist and non-Communist opponents to his government. Guerrilla violence was implied but not spelled out in public pronouncements at that time.

Thanh, political commissar of North Vietnam's army, quotes liberally from Lenin to make his point that violence is a requisite to revolution in Vietnam. He states that "peaceful" efforts to topple Diem may have a "certain efficacy" but that the concept of violent revolution "constitutes the foundation of Marxist-Leninist doctrine"--a doctrine in which the masses must be "methodically instructed." Thanh calls for consolidation and development of guerrilla troops.

Thanh's comments are similar to the Chinese view that "an armed struggle is the principal form of waging revolution." Their own situation probably has made the North Vietnamese sympathetic to the Chinese position on this score, although Hanoi has sought to avoid getting entangled in the Sino-Soviet polemic on world-wide Communist strategy.

Since late 1959, Communist guerrilla activities in South Vietnam have been sharply intensified and have posed a security problem for the Diem government in the delta provinces south and southwest of Saigon. Incidents during September suggest that guerrilla warfare may also be spreading to mountain provinces to the north, a region until now generally secure. A widening of Communist operations throughout South Vietnam would tax the limited capability of local militias, adding new pressures on the army and the government, which is facing increasingly articulate political dissatisfaction. [REDACTED]

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### Peiping Attacks Japanese Prime Minister Ikeda

Communist China's strong propaganda attack on Japanese Prime Minister Ikeda on 11 October ended nearly three months of waiting for the new government in Tokyo to show a less "hostile" policy than the preceding administration. The official People's Daily labeled the Ikeda government as "no different in essence" from Kishi's. The paper said that far from following a professed good-neighbor foreign policy, the present administration has shown itself to be like its predecessor in toeing the US line and pushing the revival of Japanese militarism.

The change in Communist China's public attitude is apparently timed to assist Japanese Socialists in the election next month. However, the attempt may backfire as in May 1958, when the Japanese electorate reacted adversely to Chinese Communist pressure and the Liberal-Democratic party was returned to power with a greater majority.

Counting on popular Japanese interest in Sino-Japanese trade as an important factor in the elections, Peiping reiterated that there can be no significant trade until Tokyo ends its hostility. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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### Assassination of Japanese Socialist Leader

The assassination of Inejiro Asanuma, chairman of the left-wing Japanese Socialist party (JSP), on 12 October at a televised public appearance of leaders of the three major parties appears certain to generate support for leftist demonstrations in the campaign for the November election. News of the assassination touched off a demonstration by 50,000 students and union members, who demanded that Prime Minister Ikeda "take immediate responsibility" and that the Tokyo police chief resign. Zengakuren, the radical students' association, is reported planning demonstrations at the prime minister's residence for the next three days, and the chairman of Sohyo, the leftist labor federation, has asked for the resignation of the Ikeda cabinet.

Prime Minister Ikeda has moved quickly to minimize the effect of leftist attempts to blame his conservative government for the assassination. He is focusing public reaction on the recent pattern of violent behavior which the leftists themselves established in their demonstrations last spring. Ikeda held an emergency cabinet meeting immediately after the assassination and pledged that the government would probe the causes of the terrorism responsible for Asanuma's death and would take prompt measures to suppress violence.

During the special Diet session still scheduled to begin 17 October, the Socialists may try to provoke Ikeda into using "strong-arm" tactics in order to link him with the authoritarian ultranationalists responsible for stabbing Asanuma, as well as JSP leader Jotaro Kawakami, on 17 June. The conservatives will be aided in efforts to dissociate themselves from such an attack by the fact that a member of an ultranationalist organization also stabbed former Prime Minister Kishi on 14 July.

The struggle within the JSP over a successor to Asanuma will provide the party with an opportunity to reassess its strong anti-American position in the light of failure to win electoral support in four gubernatorial elections since early July. Asanuma, who has been a symbol of the JSP's anti-American, pro-Communist orientation, recently had been trying to move to a more neutral position. [REDACTED]

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